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A RECENT ATTEMPT TO LIMIT THE INDEPEND-
ENT CONTRACTOR DOCTRINE.
By a bare majority of four to three the New York Court of
Appeals has lately defeated an attempt to fasten an important
limitation upon what may be termed the Independent Con-
tractor Doctrine, i. e. the rule, briefly stated, that an employer
is not liable for injuries resulting from the negligence of an
independent contractor employed by him. The attempted
limitation is contained in the proposition that the employer
must have exercised reasonable care to select a competent con-
tractor.
In the case before the Court of Appeals (Berg v. Parsons, 156
N. Y. 1o9), the facts were as follows: Defendant owned a vacant
lot adjoining plaintiff's house in the City of New York. Desir-
ing to build upon his lot, he made a contract with one T. to
excavate for a cellar, the work requiring blasting in proximity
to plaintiff's house. The blasting could have been done by a
skillful man without damage to plaintiff. The contractor, how-
ever, did it so recklessly and unskillfully that plaintiff's house
was partially wrecked. The plaintiff, of course, had a good
cause of action against the contractor. This, however, was of
no practical value, because the contractor was financially irre-
sponsible. Plaintiff, therefore, began an action against the
employer upon the ground that the contractor "was not a com-
"petent, skillful or careful man, but, on the -contrary, was
"incompetent and unskillful and an improper person to do the
"said work of excavation, and that the defendant did not exer-
"cise proper care or due regard for the safety of the plaintiff's
"said house and premises in permitting and employing said T.
"to do said work."
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To appreciate the bearing of this allegation it is necessary
to take a glance at the history and present status of the Inde-
pendent Contractor Doctrine.
The 'rule that a man is not liable for damages caused by the
negligence of another employed by him to do a specific piece of
work, provided that other renders the service in the course of
an independent occupation, using his own means and methods
and representing the will of the employer only as to the
result of his work, is in the nature of a limitation upon the
familiar doctrine of respondeat superior. The maxim respondeat
superior, though inherited from the Roman law and become
a practical necessity of modern business conditions, is weak
in theoretical foundation, and its abstract justice has some-
times been questioned.* A sense of its harshness and a
desire to restrict its operation are no doubt partly respon-
sible for the evolution of the Independent Contractor Doctrine.
That doctrine, though now firmly established, is of recent
origin. It was refused recognition one hundred years ago in
the famous English case of Bush v. Steinman (i Bos. and Pull.
404). In that case A., having a house, contracted with B. to
repair it for a fixed sum. B. contracted with C. to do the work,
and C. with D. to furnish the materials. The servant of D.
placed lime in the road in front of A.'s premises, by reason of
which plaintiff's carriage was overthrown and the plaintiff
injured. It was held that plaintiff was entitled to recover
damages of A., the owner of the house. The court which
decided Bush v. Steinman confessedly found difficulty in
assigning satisfactory grounds for the decision, and repeated
assaults made during the next fifty years finally resulted in its
overthrow. It was sought to be sustained upon two grounds:
ist, the ground of agency and the doctrine of reslpondeat suoerior;
2d, the ground that an owner of real estate is liable for dam-
ages resulting from work done upon his land under the maxim
sic utere tuo ut alienum non ladas. The case of Quarman v. Burnett
(6 M. & W. 499, decided in 1840), finally disposed of the first
ground, and Reedie v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co. (4 Exch. 244, decided
in 1849), disposed of the second, holding that there is no distinc-
tion between the owners of real estate and the owners of per-
sonalty. These cases firmly established the Independent Con-
tractor Doctrine in England.
* See for example remarks found in Collett v. Foster, 2 Hurlst. and N.
356; Smith v. Keal L. R. 9 Q. B. Div. 340; Hays v. Millar, 77 Pa. St. 238;
Shea v. Reems, 36 La. Ann. o66.
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The American courts, while not entirely agreed, have gen-
erally adopted the later English view and repudiated Bush v.
Steinman. Some of the cases in which the question has been
most elaborately considered are referred to in the note.*
The doctrine elaborated in these cases is subject, however,
to certain well recognized limitations. These have been vari-
ously classified, perhaps nowhere more clearly than in the
opinion of Chief Judge Andrews in a recent New York case
(Engel v. The Eureka Club, i37 N. Y. ioo). Judge Andrews,
after briefly stating the general doctrine of non-liability of the
employer for the negligence of his contractor, goes on to say:
"There are well-understood exceptions to this rule of exemp-
"tion. Cases of statutory duty imposed upon individuals or
"corporations; of contracts which are unlawful, or which pro-
"vide for the doing of acts which, when performed, will create
"a nuisance, are exceptions. In cases of the first-mentioned
"class the power and duty imposed cannot be delegated so as to
"exempt the person who accepts the duty imposed, from respon-
"sibility, and in those of the second class exemption from lia-
"bility would be manifestly contrary to public policy, since it
"would shield the one who directed the commission of the
"wrong. * * * There are cases of still another class where
"the thing contracted to be done is necessarily attended with
"danger, however skillfully and carefully performed, or, in the
"language of Judge Dillon, is ' intrinsically dangerous,' in which
"case it is held that the party who lets the contract to do the
"act cannot thereby escape from responsibility for any injury
"resulting from its execution, although the act to be per-
"formed may be lawful (2 Dillon on Mun. Corp., Sec. 1029,
"and cases cited). But if the act to be done may be safely
"done in the exercise of due care, although in the absence of
"such care injurious consequences to third persons would be
"likely to result, then the contractor alone is liable, provided it
"was his duty under the contract to exercise such care."
In this statement Judge Andrews does not notice the limita-
tion contended for in Berg v. Parsons, which was already begun
when the Engel case was decided. The proposition, however,
was by no means unheard-of. On the contrary, had fre-
quently been assumed, by both judges and text-book writers, to
* Blake v. Ferris, i Seld. 48; Hilliard v. Richardson, 3 Oray 349; Cuff v
The N. & N. Y. R. R. Co., 35 N. J. Law 17; McCafferty v. .S. D. & P. M. R.
R. Co., 61 N. Y. 178.
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be the. law.* It was even supposed to have been squarely
adopted as the ground of the Court's decision in at least two
cases, ofte in Connecticut and one in Missouri.t A cldse scru-
tiny of" these. cases, however, does not quite bear .out the
assumption. In the Connecticut case (an action for injuries
caused by blasting) the trial Court had charged the jury: "If
"you find from the evidence that those contractors, or either of
"them, were unskillful and incompetent to perform the work
"assumed by them under the contract, and that the borough,
"knowing this, employed them to do the work, the borough
"would be negligent in knowingly employing such a person to
"do the work, and would be responsible for any negligence of
"such a contractor, in the same manner that the contractor
"would be liable for his own negligence." The Supreme Court
said: "We think this language imposed upon the borough a
"too limited measure of liability; that it would be liable, as
"stated, not only in consequence of negligence which would
"certainly be most gross, in knowingly employing incompetent
"contractors, but also in failing to exercise due and reasonable
"care to select such as were skillful and competent." This lan-
guage is closely in point, but as other questions were involved in
the case, and the Court had already decided in favor of the
appellant on other grounds, the point was unnecessary to the
decision.
* In McCafferty v. S. D. & P. M. R. R. Co., 61 N. Y. 178 (the leading case
in New York upon non-liability of an employer for blasting done by an inde-
pendent contractor), the Court says (per Earl. C., p. 182): -The injuries were
"not occasioned in consequence of the omission of any duty which was incum-
bent on the defendant. It had let the contract, so far as aptfiears, to a com-
" Ietent ferson."
In Cuff v. The N. & N.. Y. R. R. oCo., 35 N. J. Law 17 (a case arising out
of the negligent use of nitro-glycerine by the employee of a sub-contractor),
it is said:
"When the work is not in itself a nuisance, and the injury results from
"the negligence of such contractor or his servants in the execution of it. the
" contractor alone is liable, unless the owner is in default in embloying an
" unskillful or infrofierfterson as the contractor."
Similar expressions are to be found in Ardesco Oil Co. v. Gilson, 63 Pa.
St. 146; Connors v. Hennessey. 112 Mass. 96; Sturges v. Theological Educa-
tional Society, 13o Mass. 414; Ware v. St. Paul Water Co.. 2 Abb. U. S. 261
(Circ. Ct. Minn.,'187o, Nelson, J.); Burns v. McDonald, 57 Mo. App. 599.
In the fifth edition of Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, Section 168, it
is said: "To this exemption from responsibility (i. e. of the employer for the
"negligent acts of the contractor), there is a single important qualification-
"that the einfloyer must have used ordinary care to select a contractor of
"iArofier shill andfprudence."
See slso Wharton on Negligence, Sec. 181; Story on Agency, Sec. 454a,
note; II Thompson on Negligence, p. 899; Thomas on Negligence, p. 343.
f The Norwalk Gaslight Co. v. The Borough of Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495;
Brannock v. Elmore, 1I4 Mo. 55.
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In the Missouri case (also an action for damages from reck-
less blasting done by independent contractors) it appeared that
the contractors had been in the habit of blasting withoAt
* covering their blasts with timber, as required by a municipal
ordinance, and that the employer knew this. In view of such
knowledge the Court held the employer liable on the theory of
an implied permission to the contractors to blast in the im-
proper manner to which they were accustomed, which implied
permission, said the Court, "is equivalent to a direction to do
"so." This somewhat unsatisfactory reasoning impairs the
value of the case as an authority on the question involved in
Berg v. Parsons, despite some favorable dicta in the opinion.
We have referred to these two decisions somewhat at length
because one or two recent authors have too.hastily assumed
that they settled the law. On the contrary, the real situation
before Berg v. Parsons may be summarized in the words of a
text-book writer twelve years ago:* "Some of the judges in
"their opinions have qualified the rule (i. e. the Independent
"Contractor Doctrine) by assuming that it is only applicable to
"cases where the proprietor has not been guilty of negligence
"in awarding a contract to a person incompetent, habitually
"negligent, or otherwise unfit to be intrusted with'it. No case
"has been found, however, where a proprietor has been held
"answerable for the negligence of an independent contractor,
"upon this ground alone."
So much for the status of the Independent Contractor Doc-
trine when Berg v. Parsons started upon its somewhat checkered
course. When the case came to trial, plaintiff introduced
evidence tending to show that the contractor was incompetent,
and that the defendant failed to exercise proper care in his selec-
tion. The evidence uponthe latter point was to the effect that the
contractor was unknown to the defendant, and not well known
in the business, but was the lowest bidder for the work; that he
had shown recklessness or want of skill in previous jobs of
the same character; that he was wholly illiterate, and lived in
a shanty on the rocks, of which facts defendant had notice;
that he was very intemperate and showed it in his personal
appearance. The defendant on the other hand introduced evi-
dence tending to show that some inquiry had been made and
some care exercised. The Court, upon the strength of the
Connecticut case already referred to, and after considerable
hesitation, denied a motion to dismiss and sent the case to the
II Thompson on Negligence, p. 9o8 (1886).
2
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jury, and the jury gave plaintiff a verdict for the 'amount of
damage proved. Defendant thereupon took an appeal to the
General Term of the Supreme Court, an intermediate appellate
tribunal. The Genteral Term (two justices sitting) rendered an
opinion approving the proposition of law for which plaintiff
was contending, but reversed the judgment and ordered a
new trial for errors in the admission of evidence and in the
charge to the jury.* A new trial was had before another
judge and jury, and plaintiff again obtained a verdict. The
judgment entered upon this verdict was affirmed by the Gen-
eral Term (three justices sitting,)t and defendant appealed to
the Court of last resort.
Up to this point five judges of the Supreme Court had passed
upon the law of the case, and all had pronounced in favor of
plaintiff's position. Three judges of the Court of Appeals took
the same view. The other four, however, thought otherwise,
and reversed the judgment. The prevailing opinion, after a
lengthy citation of authorities upon the general proposition
that an employer is not liable for the negligence of his con-
tractor where the relation of master and servant, or principal
and agent, does not exist, concludes as follows:
"There are certain exceptional cases where a person em-
"ploying a contractor is liable, which, briefly stated, are: Where
"the employer personally interferes with the work, and the
"acts performed by him occasion the injury; where the thing
'contracted to be done is unlawful; where the acts performed
"create a public nuisance; and where an employer is bound by
"a Statute to do a thing efficiently and an injury results from
"its inefficiency. Manifestly, this case falls within none of the
"exceptions to which we have referred. There was no inter-
"ference by the defendant. The thing contracted to be done
"was lawful. The work did not constitute a public nuisance,
"and there was no Statute binding the defendant to efficiently
"perform it. In none of those exceptional cases does the qiles-
tion of negligence arise. There the action is based upon the
"wrongful act of the party, and may be maintained against the
"author or the person performing or continuing it. In the case
"at bar the work contracted for was lawful and necessary for
"the improvement and use of the defendant's property. Con-
"sequently no liability can be based upon the illegality of the
"transaction, but it must stand upon the negligence of the
"contractor or his employee alone. It seems very obvious that,
"under the authorities, the defendant was not responsible for
"the acts of the contractor or his employees, and that the Court
"should have granted the d6fendant's motion for a nonsuit. If
*Berg v. Parsons, 84 Hun 60.
t-Berg v. Parsons, go Hun 267.
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"a contrary rule were established it would not only impose
"upon the owners of real property an improper restraint in con-
"tracting for its improvement, but would open a new and un-
"limited field for actions for the negligence of others which has
"not hitherto existed in this State, and practically overrule a
"long line of decisions in this Court, which firmly establish a
"contrary doctrine."
It is to-be regretted that the Court did not see fit to enter
upon a discussion of the theory and merits of plaintiff's posi-
tion on broad grounds of reason and justice, instead of confin-
ing itself so closely to the question of precedents. The pre-
vailing opinion, while it makes the law, does little to make it
acceptable. The real difficulty with plaintiff's proposition ap-
pears to have been (and this was probably the obstacle in the
minds of the Court), not any lack of abstract justice, but the lack
of some rule of existing law which could be stretched to cover
the case. The judgment could scarcely be sustained on the
simple ground of negligence of the employer, because, granting
that the employer was guilty of an act of negligence in em-
ploying the incompetent contractor, that act was not the proxi-
mate cause of the injury. The connection between defendant's
negligence and plaintiff's injury was broken by an intervening
responsible cause.* Nor under the doctrine respondeat superior,
because that doctrine, as already seen, has been limited to cases
where the strict relation of master and servant exists. Nor on
the ground that defendant was creating or permitting a nuisance
on his land.t Recourse must be had, therefore, to the broad
ground of public policy.
It would, of course, be more satisfactory to the advocates of
the innovation if they were not compelled to fall back upon
this indefinite and somewhat overworked plea. "Public policy" is
too bften made the excuse for arguments and even decisions for
which no solid basis can be found in logic or precedent. The
fact remains, however, that some'of the legal doctrines oftenest
invoked have no better foundation. The doctrine of respondeat
superior is a notable example, as far at least as our English law
is concerned.t A reason assigned by high authority for that
* I Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, Sec. 32 et seq.; Cuff v. The N. &
N. Y. R. R. Co., 35 N. J. Law XT.
t Booth v. Rome, Watertown and Ogdensburg Terminal Railroad Co., I4o
N. Y. 267.
tThe explanation of the doctrine in the Roman Law appears to be his-
torieal, going back to the time when servants were slaves. See elaborate
note by Judge 0. W. Holmes at star page 260, II Kent's Commentaries,
12th Edition.
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doctrine is, that "it is the duty of the master to employ ser-
"vants who are honest, skillful and careful."* Why should not
the same duty exist in the employment of independent con-
tractors? The proposition seems eminently reasonable. As
said in the dissenting opinion in Berg v. Parsons:
"The principle of the decision below, in the present case, in
"my judgment, in no respect weakens the doctrine of the
"exemption of the general employer from liability for damages
"caused by the negligence of the independent contractor; nor,
"in any wise, threatens its stability. Nor does it affect it,
"otherwise than by establishing a reasonable safeguard against
"too broad a claim for exemption. It seems to me a proposi-
"tion, as clear as it is reasonable, that the assumption that
"there has been an exercise of due care in the selection of a
"competent and careful contractor, is a part of the foundation
"for the doctrine. I do not think that it would do to hold that
"a person, by the mere act of employing a contractor to do some
"work of a nature in itself. obviously hazardous to others,
"thereby discharges himself of all responsibility. Something
"more is required of him. With that due regard for his neigh-
"bor's rights, which is obligatory upon all, in the use which
"they make of their own property, he should be held to the
"exercise of reasonable care and of some deliberation in the
"selection of a contractor."
The law at present stands otherwise. With all respect for
the New York Court of Appeals, however, we venture the pre-
diction that other courts may decline to follow its lead, and
that possibly the last word upon the subject, even in the State
of New York, has not yet been spoken.
CHARLES W. PIERSON.
II Kent's Commentaries (fourteenth edition), star page 259.
